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ISO 27001 · Cloud and suppliers

ISO 27001 on AWS and Azure: where the line falls

Surendra Pal SinghChief Information Security Officer & Data Protection OfficerCISO · DPO · CISA · MCSE · ITIL · ISO 27001 Lead Auditor · ISO 27701 Lead Auditor · ISO 42001 Lead Auditor

12 min readLast reviewed

The short answer

Your cloud provider’s ISO 27001 certificate covers the provider’s own management system for the services inside its declared scope. It is not transitive. It gives you real evidence for the layer you no longer operate, which is the building, the hardware, the hypervisor and the physical network, and it gives you nothing for the layer you do operate: identity, configuration, encryption choices, logging and response, backups, and the whole of your own ISMS. In practice the cloud removes a handful of physical controls and makes access, logging and supplier management harder rather than easier.

Retrieve your provider’s current certificate and scope statement from their own compliance portal. What is inside their scope changes, and no third-party summary stays accurate.

In this lesson

After this lesson you can:

  • Say precisely what a cloud provider’s ISO 27001 certificate does and does not do for your certification.
  • Sort the Annex A controls in your environment into inherited, shared and entirely yours.
  • Answer the cloud questions a Stage 2 auditor will put to you, with evidence rather than the provider’s certificate.

Read first: The Annex A controls and how scope is determined

What the provider’s certificate actually covers.

Every major cloud platform holds ISO 27001 certification and publishes the certificate, its scope statement and supporting audit reports in a compliance portal. Read the scope statement rather than the headline, because that is the entire content of the assurance.

What it says, in substance, is that this provider operates an information security management system covering these named services in these named regions, and an accredited certification body examined it. That is a genuinely valuable statement. It is also a statement about them.

The thing people hope it says, and it never says, is that workloads running on those services are themselves certified. Certification does not flow downhill. If it did, every company on a certified platform would be certified by default, and the standard would mean nothing. We are not going to reproduce any provider’s current scope here, because those change and a stale list on a page like this is worse than no list. Go to the provider’s portal and download today’s certificate.

Where the line actually falls.

Cloud providers describe this as shared responsibility, which is accurate and slightly misleading, because the two halves are not comparable in size. The provider’s half is deep and narrow. Your half is shallow and extremely wide, and it is where essentially all of your findings will come from.

Control areaWhose controlWhat that means in an audit
Data centre physical security, power, coolingProviderTheir certificate is your evidence. You operate none of it.
Hypervisor, host patching, physical networkProviderInside their scope, outside your control.
Hardware disposal and media sanitisationProviderYou still need a policy for your own endpoints.
Identity, roles and permissions in your accountYouThey supply the mechanism. You decide who gets what.
Network configuration, security groups, exposureYouA public bucket is your finding, not theirs.
Encryption choices and key managementYouAvailable does not mean enabled, and the auditor checks enabled.
Guest OS and application patchingYouVaries with the service model. Managed services shift some of it.
Logging, monitoring and who reads the alertsYouThey emit the logs. Retention and response are yours.
Backups, and proving a restore worksYouDurable storage is not a tested recovery process.
Your ISMS: scope, risk, internal audit, reviewYouNo provider certificate touches any of this.
Figure 1 Which side of the line each control sits onSource: ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A, read against the shared responsibility model

One row deserves emphasis because it is where the most expensive mistakes live. Encryption is available on almost every managed service, and availability is not implementation. An auditor does not ask whether your provider offers encryption at rest. They ask you to show that it is enabled on the specific store holding the specific data, and who holds the keys.

What you can genuinely lean on.

There is real relief here and it is worth claiming properly. Where you have genuinely transferred an activity, the provider’s certificate is your evidence that the activity is controlled, and you are not expected to audit a data centre you cannot enter.

The honest list is short. Physical and environmental security for infrastructure you do not operate. Hardware maintenance and media disposal for hardware you do not own. The host layer underneath your workloads. That is more or less it, and for a company that previously ran a server room it is a meaningful reduction in both control count and audit attention.

How to claim it correctly in your Statement of Applicability: do not mark those controls not applicable. Mark them applicable and implemented through the provider, naming the provider and citing the certificate as the evidence. Not applicable means the control does not apply to your organisation. Implemented by a supplier means it applies and someone else performs it, which is a different statement and the one that is true.

What stays entirely yours.

Everything in clauses 4 to 10 is yours, without exception and without reduction. Your scope, your risk assessment, your Statement of Applicability, your objectives, your competence and awareness arrangements, your internal audit, your management review, your corrective actions. No provider certificate reduces any of it by a single requirement, and this is where most of the audit duration sits.

Within Annex A, the cloud actively increases the difficulty of several areas:

  • Identity and access. Cloud makes it trivial to grant broad permissions and hard to see who holds what. Your access review is harder in the cloud, not easier.
  • Asset inventory. Infrastructure that can be created by a script is infrastructure that can exist without anyone recording it. An inventory that only lists laptops is a finding.
  • Logging and monitoring. The platform emits far more than you can read. Retention periods, alerting rules, and who actually looks are all yours.
  • Change management. Infrastructure as code is a control opportunity and a risk. The auditor will want to see review and approval on infrastructure changes, not only application ones.
  • Supplier management. You now have more suppliers than you did, each holding some of your data, and monitoring them over time is a control in its own right.

A.5.23 is your control, not theirs.

This is the single most misunderstood control in a cloud environment, and the misunderstanding is almost always in the same direction. A.5.23, information security for cloud services, concerns the processes by which your organisation acquires, uses, manages and exits cloud services. It is about your behaviour as a cloud customer.

So a company that runs entirely on cloud services has made this control more applicable, not less. The justification we see offered, that A.5.23 is not applicable because everything is on a certified cloud, reads to an auditor as proof that the control was never read. It is a short route to a finding on the Statement of Applicability itself, which then casts doubt on every other justification in the document.

What the control wants from you, in practice:

  1. A defined way of deciding to adopt a cloud service, including who approves it and on what information.
  2. Security requirements set before adoption rather than discovered after.
  3. Clarity on the responsibility split, recorded somewhere other than in someone’s head.
  4. Agreements that address security, incident notification and data handling.
  5. An exit plan: how you would get your data out, and in what form.

Item five is the one nearly nobody has, and it is the one auditors increasingly ask for.

What the auditor asks about cloud.

Expect these in the engineering and operations interviews, and note that producing the provider’s certificate answers none of them.

  • Show me your cloud asset inventory. How does something created by a script get onto it?
  • Who can create resources in production, and what stops someone creating an unmonitored one?
  • Show me the permissions of a named engineer, and tell me why they have them.
  • Show me that encryption is enabled on this specific data store, and tell me who controls the key.
  • What is publicly reachable from the internet in your estate, and how do you know that list is current?
  • Walk me through a change to infrastructure configuration. Who reviewed it?
  • Which log sources feed your monitoring, how long are they retained, and who responded to the last alert?
  • Show me your assessment of this provider, and the agreement clauses covering security.

What an auditor actually asks covers the interview format more broadly, and the pattern holds here: describe the routine, then produce the record it generates.

Multi-cloud, SaaS and the fourth party.

Two complications worth planning for rather than discovering.

SaaS is the bigger exposure than infrastructure. Most organisations think about their compute provider and forget that their support desk, CRM, analytics and file sharing all hold customer data. Each is a supplier inside your scope, each needs a place in your supplier register, and the auditor will sample a few. The reason this is worse than infrastructure is that SaaS tools are adopted by individual teams with a company card and no security review, which is precisely what A.5.23 exists to prevent.

Your providers have providers. A SaaS tool you depend on may run on the same cloud platform you do, which means a single regional failure can take out what you believed were independent systems. Your supplier assessment should record who your significant suppliers depend on, at least for the ones your service cannot operate without.

Four expensive misreadings.

Each of these costs real money, and all four are common enough to be predictable.

Treating the provider’s certificate as your certificate. Usually surfaces in a customer security questionnaire, where a company answers yes to ISO 27001 certification on the basis of their host. That answer is a misrepresentation to a customer, and it is discovered the moment someone asks for the certificate.

Confusing available with enabled. The provider offers the capability. You either turned it on or you did not, and the audit examines which.

Marking cloud controls not applicable. Covered above, and it damages the credibility of the whole Statement of Applicability rather than just that line.

Assuming the cloud shrinks the programme. It shrinks your physical control set and leaves clauses 4 to 10 untouched. Audit duration is driven mainly by headcount and scope complexity, so budgeting for a cheap certification because you own no servers is a forecasting error rather than a saving.

Want your responsibility split written down?

We map your cloud and SaaS estate against Annex A, mark which controls you inherit, which you share and which are entirely yours, and produce the evidence list your auditor will ask for. It is the document most cloud-native companies are missing.

Key takeaways.

  • Certification is not transitive. A provider’s certificate covers the provider’s management system for the services in its declared scope, and nothing of yours.
  • Retrieve the certificate and scope statement from the provider’s own compliance portal. Scopes change, so no third-party summary stays accurate.
  • What you genuinely inherit is short: physical and environmental security, hardware disposal, and the host layer beneath your workloads.
  • Claim it correctly. Mark those controls applicable and implemented through the provider, with the certificate as evidence, rather than not applicable.
  • Clauses 4 to 10 are untouched by any provider certificate, and that is where most of the audit duration sits.
  • A.5.23 becomes more applicable the more cloud you use. Marking it not applicable because you are cloud-native reads as proof the control was not read.
  • Available is not enabled. The auditor asks you to show encryption on the specific store and name who holds the key.
  • SaaS is usually a bigger exposure than infrastructure, because tools get adopted with a company card and no security review.

Quick check.

  1. A storage bucket in your account is publicly readable and customer data leaks. Whose control failed?

    1. The cloud provider’s, since they host the storage
    2. Yours, since access configuration is on your side of the line
    3. Both equally
    4. Neither, if the provider is ISO 27001 certified
    Check the answer

    B. The provider supplies the mechanism and you decide the configuration. Access and exposure settings inside your account are yours under the shared responsibility model, and the provider’s certificate neither covers nor excuses them. A.5.23, information security for cloud services

  2. Your infrastructure is entirely on a certified cloud. Which Annex A area is most genuinely reduced?

    1. Access control
    2. Physical and environmental security for infrastructure you no longer operate
    3. Logging and monitoring
    4. Supplier management
    Check the answer

    B. You do not run the building, so those controls transfer and the provider’s certificate is your evidence. Access, logging and supplier management all get harder in the cloud rather than easier, because the mechanisms multiply. Clause 4.3, determining the scope of the ISMS

  3. Spot the mistake. A company marks A.5.23 not applicable in its Statement of Applicability on the grounds that it is fully cloud-native and operates no servers.

    Check the answer

    The reasoning inverts the control.. A.5.23 concerns how an organisation acquires, uses and manages cloud services. Being fully cloud-native makes it one of the most applicable controls in the annex, not one of the least. An auditor will treat the justification as evidence that the control was not understood. A.5.23, information security for cloud services

Sources.

Changes since publication

This page states no cloud provider’s certificate scope, service list or region coverage. Those are published by each provider in its own compliance portal and they change, so a list reproduced here would go stale. Download the current certificate from the provider.

Last checked against our own Annex A control and clause reference pages, and ISO’s catalogue entries for the certification-body standards on 9 November 2026.

Questions people ask.

Is AWS ISO 27001 certified?
The major cloud providers hold ISO 27001 certification and publish their current certificates, scope statements and audit reports in their own compliance portals. Which services and regions sit inside the scope changes over time, so retrieve the current certificate from the provider rather than relying on any third-party summary, including this one.
Does our provider’s certificate mean we are ISO 27001 compliant?
No, and the gap is larger than it sounds. Their certificate attests to their management system for their services. Yours would attest to yours. Nothing in their scope covers your risk assessment, your Statement of Applicability, your access decisions, your internal audit or your management review, which is most of what certification actually examines.
Does being entirely on a certified cloud reduce our audit days?
Sometimes, modestly, because you operate no data centre and so there are fewer physical and environmental controls of yours to examine. It does not reduce the clause 4 to 10 machinery, which is where most of the audit duration sits. Treat it as a small adjustment rather than a strategy.
Can we mark cloud-related Annex A controls as not applicable?
Rarely, and almost never the ones people try. Controls you have genuinely transferred, such as operating a building, can be justified. A.5.23, which concerns how you acquire, use and manage cloud services, becomes more applicable the more cloud you use rather than less. Marking it not applicable because you are cloud-native inverts the control.
The provider is certified, so do we still need supplier due diligence on them?
Yes. The certificate is the evidence your due diligence collects, not a reason to skip it. You still need to record that you assessed them, what the assessment concluded, what your agreement with them says about security, and how you monitor that over time.
What about SaaS tools rather than infrastructure?
The same logic, with a worse data problem. Your CRM, support desk and analytics tools hold customer data and sit inside your scope as suppliers. The question for each is what data it holds, what the contract says, and what assurance you have, and the auditor will usually sample a handful from your supplier register.
Our provider is certified in a different country. Does that matter?
For the certificate’s recognition, generally not, provided it is accredited. For your obligations, possibly very much, because where your data is processed can engage data protection and sector rules that ISO 27001 does not address. Those are separate questions and the certificate answers neither.

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